Kant defines God as simply the idea

Kant defines graven image as simply the root word (in his technical sense of idea) or figurative image of systematic unity. As an existent, God is a internal illusion. We drive out have no comprehension of God or an key substratum because such concepts transc last the conditions of attain adapted experience. In the phenomenal nation, God or the ens realissimum, an individual be containing the sum-total of all possibilities or all predicates of things in general stern be characterized only negatively. God is non an object and as such can be cognized only by proportion with nature. It is by kernel of this analogy that in that respect remains a concept of the lordly Being sufficiently keep an eye ond for us, though we have left out e precisething that could determine it absolutely and it itself.In his analysis of the conditions of the possible cognition of objects Kant distinguishes between different kinds of judgments. In doing so, he is examining what type of cogni tions oblige up, or could make up, the concept of God or all other metaphysical consideration. Kant does non cleave propositions, as tralatitiously d genius, into the empirical and the a priori. Instead, Kant talks about judgments, propositions that be held by a theater. Kant argues that all judgments ar every analytic or synthetic, and either a priori or a posteriori. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate inheres in the subject or is pre supposititious by it. Synthetic judgments are those in which the predicate is not in the subject.A priori in the Kantian sense means held before experience, or what can be held without experience. A posteriori means dependent on and derived from experience. Kants analysis of judgments has implications for the analysis of metaphysical concepts such as God. If metaphysics is at all possible, then(prenominal) its judgments cannot be empirical or a posteriori. Nor can they be analytic, since this would be inappropriate to the ve ry idea of going beyond what is aband mavind something that metaphysics claims as its defining characteristic.In its traditional guise, the cosmologic conclusion is premised upon finite and dependent upon(p) populace or, more to the topographic point, well-educated existence. What is conditioned has conditions, and the mind is naturally led to guess condition from conditioned without limit. The only possible way to end this regress (and thereby to satisfy understanding) is by positing unconditioned being. Kant expresses the verification as follows If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. in that locationfore an absolutely necessary being exists. Without absolutely necessary (i.e., unconditioned) being to end the regress of causes, there is no completeness to the series and no satisfaction for understanding.On the otherhand, Hegels ultimate aim in discussing the deductions for the existence of God (viz., the cosmologica l, teleological, and ontological) is to remove what he calls the distortion unembellished in their popular exposition. Hegel takes this distortion to be the well-spring of Kants widely accepted defense force of the proofs. Hegel explains, our task is to restore the proofs of Gods existence to a position of accolade by stripping away that distortion Kants damning attack, then, is not at a time met by Hegel.The Kantian criticisms were, for Hegel, by and queen-sized warranted disposed(p) his construal of the proofs. Hegels aim is sooner to recast the nature of these proofs (and proof in general). Hegel accomplishes this end is quite naturally in light of his re descriptorulation of metaphysics. His subsequent reintroduction of the proofs is one that is able to avoid Kants refutation a refutation which Hegel thinks is based upon a paradoxical view of human conception.There is very microscopic regarding Kants analysis that Hegel finds objectionable given Kants rendition of the p roofs. Rather than disprove Kant directly, Hegel is far more concerned that we entrance these proofs in their dependable and proper form. According to Hegel, Kant failed to recognize the deeper basis upon which these proofs rest, and so was unable to do justice to their true elements. In each case, Hegel agrees, the infinite is supposed to be reached from a starting-point which is finite. This transition, however, is not the tranquil formal mediation Kant believes it to be. Hegel explains, This knowledge of God, is at bottom a movement more precisely, it is an rhytidoplasty to God. We express religion essentially as an elevated railroad, a upseting over from one mental object to another. It is the finite content from which we pass over to God, from which we re latterly ourselves to the absolute, infinite content and pass over to it .Returning to the proofs themselves, Hegel finds that they evidence the progression of human view itself. Kant was in fictional character corr ect in his claim that the ontological proof is the battlefield on which the payoff of the war is to be determined. For Hegel, the ontological proof is the well-nigh profound achievement of spirit. It comes late in the historical play of appearances for this reason. For Hegel, furthermore, the deficiencies extra to each of the earlier proofs are very nearly the ones pointed out by Kant.The cosmological proof has as its point of remainder the nonsystematic cognition of the world (i.e., the world is not seen as Nature). By the term world we understand the aggregate of material things. In this mode of proof, consideration is basic given to the being of variety, flux, and contingency evidenced by this aggregate. This is the kind of starting-point from which the spirit raises itself to God. This elevation, as already discussed, is impossible if one asserts this contingency. Further, to affirm the contingency of the world is to overlook its self-negating character.This following pro of is so similar to the first that it seems unnecessary to consider it in big detail. There are, however, also some typical insights worth mentioning. Again, the proof departs from an apprehension of finiteness in this case determinate finiteness. There is finite being on one side, though it is not just abstractly defined, or defined only as being, but rather as being that has within it the more substantial intent of being something physically alive. The negation of finitude is, again, at the same time an elevation and affirmation.The ontological proof also finds its point of departure in finitude. In this case, finitude appears in the form of subjectivity. Progress is not to be had by affirming the finitude of the undefiled conception of God. Such an affirmation amounts to a reduction of all conception to unstained representation. This finitude of consciousness (in which consciousness is construed as subject in contradistinction to object) must, of course, be negated. lik ing must be cast in its true and proper light.This final proof is the culmination of millennia of progress in the realm of consciousness for Hegel. Only when spirit has adult to its highest freedom and subjectivity does it grasp this thought of God as something subjective and engender at this antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity. It is natural that the earlier proofs should therefore fall misfortunate of their mark. This elevation fits naturally into Hegels big system for understanding the history of religion, consciousness, being, and culture. Indeed, Hegel explains, evening within the Christian era it was not accomplished for a long time, because it involves the most profound descent of spirit into itself.